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RA Posts Spring 2022

Deal or no deal for Iran?

By Shriya Kosuru

April 1, 2022

Since coming to power, one of the top goals of the Biden administration has been to set the Iran Nuclear deal in place again. After 11 months of negotiations, the deal appeared to be finally nearing an end a few months ago. However, on Sunday, March 27, U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malle said he was not confident that a nuclear deal was imminent. In this piece, I argue that a deal would be in the best interests of both Iran and the global community, as it would focus on removing sanctions on Iran, halting Iran’s nuclear program, and an opportunity to re-establish diplomacy in the Middle East

Overview of the Iran Nuclear deal 

The 2015 Iran Nuclear deal focused on slowing Iran’s nuclear program development which has been ramping in the last decade. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the former Iran Nuclear deal, put restrictions on Iran’s uranium stockpile and its ability to produce enriched uranium and plutonium, in return for lifting economic sanctions on Iran. The agreement heavily focused on enriched uranium and plutonium because they are the main components in the production of nuclear weapons. To produce these radioactive materials, uranium can be used in centrifuges in a process called enrichment or irradiated in a nuclear reactor to make plutonium. The deal aimed to reduce the usage of these radioactive materials by 98% and commit Iran to redesign its nuclear reactor, so it could not be used to produce weapons-grade plutonium. 

The goal of the deal was to halt the nuclear race in the Middle East, specifically between countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. Moreover, as an incentive for compliance, the deal lifted economic sanctions put in place by the UN on Iran to help recover its economy. In 2018,  President Trump withdrew from the Nuclear deal, which he had criticized as a ‘horrible one-sided deal’ during his campaign. However, new rounds of negotiations began in 2021 to put a new deal in place. In the last few months, the talks have surrounded bringing a new deal in place, which would look different from the original, since Iran’s nuclear program has advanced dramatically and any limits on uranium would add no value in halting the nuclear race. It is expected that Iran has a stockpile of enriched uranium larger than allowed under the original deal, as well as advanced centrifuges. Alongside restricting Iran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons, the negotiations have also focused on sanctions. On one hand, Biden’s administration only wants to remove sanctions imposed on Iran by President Trump, which are in violation of the 2015 deal. Whereas, Iran is demanding the removal of all sanctions. Additional discussions, such as the release of US prisoners by Iran, have caused a delay in setting a new deal in place. However, whether a future for the deal exists or not will become clear in the next few rounds of talks. 

Timeline of the deal  

2015: P5+1 which consists of the US, UK, France, China, Russia, and Germany, proposed the JCPOA with UN support. This led to the preparation and implementation of the deal, as well as the removal of sanctions placed on Iran. This deal aimed to reduce the use of installed enrichment centrifuges from twenty thousand to five thousand kilograms during a 10 year period. Additionally, it intended to limit uranium enrichment to 3.67% to halt nuclear development. One of the key conditions of the deal was that Iran had to convert its Fordow facility into a physics research center for up to fifteen years. In return, the US would release Iran’s frozen assets of 100-150 billion dollars and equip them with 4 S 300 air defense systems.

2016: The JCPOA went into implementation on January 16, lifting heaving sanctions off Iran.

2018: The Trump administration withdrew from JCPOA and imposed drastic sanctions on Iran, leading to a poor economy and regional instability in the Middle East. The Trump administration viewed the Iran Nuclear deal as heavily flawed. One of the flaws explained by the Trump administration was Iran’s political and military leaders’ access to huge assets, which could make Iran a stronger threat in the Middle East. 

2021: The Biden administration re-opened the conversation with Iran for a new deal through negotiation rounds between the two countries, using intermediaries in Austria. The negotiations have been going on since late April 2021 with increasing demands from Iran, placing pressure on the Biden administration to get an effective deal. 

2022: The discussion for a new deal has continued into 2022. These negotiations take into account new developments in Iran’s nuclear program, which has advanced drastically since 2018, along with the concern of the oil supply crisis. If a deal is put in place, then it is expected that Iran will provide much-needed relief to the oil price crisis by becoming one of the biggest oil exporters.

Why Iran is better off with the deal than economic sanctions

A deal would be in the best interests of Iran because it will help their shattered economy to recover from the effects of sanctions. It would also give the international community a chance to restore regional stability in the Middle East. 

The sanctions imposed after the JCPOA crumbled have destroyed Iran’s economy, as it has alienated them from the global economy and shut them from trade opportunities with countries across the world. When the deal took place in 2015, Iran substantially increased oil exports to about 2.1 million barrels, helping them reach their pre-sanctions levels. This had a large impact on Iran’s economy, as it was 80% dependent on oil exports. Additionally, the US and European countries unfroze about $100 billion worth of Iranian assets, pumping money into Iran’s economy and bolstering their trade relations. This set a strong example that Iran was far better off with a deal rather than with the sanctions, as they had the freedom to rebuild their economy with oil exports. 

In 2018, President Trump backed out from the Iran Nuclear deal. The Trump administration viewed this deal as poorly structured, as it provided Iran the autonomy to fund proxy wars and further regional instability. The administration advocated for a deal that would focus on having better relations with Israel and put a complete stop to the ballistic missile program of Iran. 

With the US withdrawal, Iran was left with the freedom to continue its uranium enrichment under no supervision or accountability, strengthen its nuclear facilities for more than just civilian research purposes, and go beyond the previously established stockpile limits of uranium. Following this, a set of economic sanctions were imposed upon Iran to prevent the exploitation of their nuclear facility, isolating Iran from the world. These sanctions directed Iran’s economy down a crippling path. 

The 2018 economic sanctions led to a halt in the export of oil from Iran to Russia, France, Spain, and the rest of Europe. Iran’s economy drastically declined as its oil exports fell from 1.9 million barrels per day in 2018 to 400,000 million barrels per day in 2020. This was a huge setback for Iran as it created a roadblock for them to monetize their oil. Moreover, in 2020, the US sanctioned over 18 Iranian banks, leading to a complete shutdown of Iran’s financial sector and causing Iran’s rial to fall even lower to the US dollar. Following the initial 2018 sanctions, inflation surged from 10% in 2017 to 30% in 2018, peaking in 2019 at 40%, and has since remained constant at about 30%. In 2021, Iran established trade relations with China by exporting oil, causing backlash from the US and European countries. 

At the moment, Iran is better off with a deal because, without one, it does not have access to the US and European oil markets, which are necessary to pump money into its economy through oil exports. Additionally, a deal would relieve some pressure over the international influence through sanctions on Iran’s government. According to TRIP’s Snap Poll VII, more than half of international relations scholars believed that the economic sanctions placed prior to 2015 were somewhat effective in their effort to change Iran’s government behavior. 

TRIP Snap Poll VII

With the Biden administration’s ‘carrot diplomacy’, Iran has increased its demands, pushing for a more autonomous deal. Iran is reaching a point of no return in its nuclear program and is shifting away from the deal. One of the big reasons Iran is moving away from the deal is because of the concerns over regional stability in the negotiations, such as Iran’s role in Yemen and Syria. From the US perspective, ensuring regional stability in the Middle East is only possible if Iran agrees to a deal. Therefore, talks of regional matters should be separate from the nuclear deal to ensure the purpose of the deal is intact. Even if a deal is reached, it faces pressure in the US Congress where there is strong opposition from Republicans .

It is in the best interest of the international community and Iran to put a nuclear deal in place, focused on integrating Iran with the rest of the world through trade and involvement in international organizations. This deal would help Iran revive its economy and give the international community a chance to restore regional stability in the Middle East. 

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Fall 2021 RA Posts

Vaccine Access and Diplomacy: the Global Response to COVID-19

By Maggie Manson

December 1, 2021

With the Delta variant of COVID-19 currently ravaging the globe and polarizing politics surrounding vaccination in the U.S., what does the future look like for vaccination of the developing world? Many experts think that country-to-country vaccine diplomacy along with the WHO-supported COVAX initiative may be the answer to widespread vaccine rollout that will get us back to some semblance of “normal.” 

Vaccine diplomacy is the practice of diplomatic exchange where one country provides access to COVID-19 vaccinations in return for diplomatic ties with the receiving country. As Dania Thafer of the Gulf International Forum puts it: “Instead of securing a country by sending troops, you can secure the country by saving lives, by saving their economy, by helping with their vaccination.” This practice has the potential to save lives by supplementing the WHO’s efforts towards global vaccine rollout which has encountered many logistical challenges, leading to slower deployment of vaccines. 

“Instead of securing a country by sending troops, you can secure the country by saving lives, by saving their economy, by helping with their vaccination” 

– Dania Thafer, Executive Director of the Gulf International Forum

The landscape of vaccine diplomacy has altered drastically since the creation of COVID-19 vaccines. Back in April 2021, China and India were engaged in a race towards the most effective and efficient campaign of vaccine diplomacy. The two countries were producing and distributing vast amounts of COVID-19 vaccines to partner countries, in an attempt to strengthen diplomatic relations and grow their spheres of influence. However, since India’s surge in cases and the emergence of the delta variant in the U.S. in March 2021, they have had to refocus their efforts and resources towards their own citizens, creating a change in the key players of vaccine diplomacy. Now, countries such as the U.S., Russia, and various European states are beginning to engage in vaccine diplomacy, while continuing to push for vaccination of their own citizens. 

The Problems with Vaccine Diplomacy 

To understand the key issues with vaccine diplomacy, it is important to look at which countries are engaging in the practice and what vaccines they are using to do so. Vaccine diplomacy leaders, China and Russia, are using SinoVac and Sputnik V, respectively. The U.S. is following behind with a mixed distribution of Pfizer, Moderna, Johnson & Johnson (J&J), and non-U.S. approved AstraZeneca. Prior to halting their campaign of vaccine diplomacy to deal with their own COVID crisis, India was distributing AstraZeneca to neighboring countries. EU countries have been late to the game but have begun to engage in vaccine diplomacy by distributing stockpiles of the AstraZeneca vaccine. Back in July,  Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE were sending some of their vaccine stockpiles to Tunisia, which was facing an acute COVID crisis. 

While the act of exchanging vaccines for goodwill and diplomatic ties may seem like an effective strategy to vaccinate developing nations, there are some key issues with this approach. First, the production scale of vaccines such as J&J, Moderna, and Pfizer presents an obstacle to the distribution of these vaccines. These effective vaccines are primarily produced in the U.S. and have highly sensitive transportation requirements to ensure they remain viable. The AstraZeneca vaccine, however, is being produced in Belgium, India, South Korea, and the UK, making access to the developing world more feasible. While this vaccine has not been approved for usage in the U.S., it has been authorized for individuals 18 and older by the WHO, making it a strong candidate for vaccine diplomacy. This allows AstraZeneca producing countries and those with stockpiles to engage in vaccine diplomacy. However, an access barrier still exists for countries located further away from AstraZeneca-producing countries. 

Another major issue with vaccine diplomacy is the effectiveness of certain vaccines used in the process. The vaccine efficacy of China’s Sinovac has been called into question by states on the receiving end of vaccine diplomacy such as Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Many of these recipient countries are turning to other sources and paying countries and companies for booster shots to supplement Sinovac. TRIP Primary Investigator Professor Michael Tierney had this to say on China’s vaccine rollout: “China was the first-mover using targeted vaccine distribution to support broader diplomatic goals, but rollout has been rocky and it may actually backfire if it fails to deliver safe and effective vaccines at levels promised last year.” While the faltering Chinese vaccine diplomacy campaign is of great concern for the health and welfare of recipient countries, this does present an opening for the U.S. to step in and aid these countries in getting their populations vaccinated. 

“China was the first-mover using targeted vaccine distribution to support broader diplomatic goals, but rollout has been rocky and it may actually backfire if it fails to deliver safe and effective vaccines at levels promised last year.”

– Professor Michael Tierney, TRIP Primary Investigator and Director of William & Mary’s Global Research Institute (GRI)

U.S. Response

The U.S. is now faced with the opportunity to improve global public health and strengthen diplomatic relations with a variety of strategically important countries. With the shortcomings of China’s vaccination efforts, the U.S. can target Southeast Asia, a region that has been largely encompassed in China’s sphere of influence in recent years. 

Generally speaking, scholars do not think the administration is effectively doing enough on an international scale. When surveyed in April 2020, 80.3% of IR scholars said that the U.S.’s role in coordinating the international response to COVID-19 was not effective at all. In April 2021, respondents thought that the U.S. was doing better, with 38.7% finding the U.S.’s role to be somewhat effective. However, scholars are still not impressed with the administration’s approach, with more than 50% reporting the U.S. role as either not very effective or not effective at all. 

Additionally, the U.S. must focus efforts towards India, for both strategic reasons and a moral obligation to do so. In TRIP’s Snap Poll 15, scholars were asked if the Biden Administration is doing enough to help in regards to India’s COVID-19 public health crisis. 67.4% of scholars answered that the administration is not doing enough to help India. This piece will explore the moral implications of vaccine diplomacy later on, but with the resources available, the U.S. is equipped to do more to save lives in India and strengthen its diplomatic presence through vaccine distribution. 

At the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly, U.S. President Joe Biden addressed the assembly and reaffirmed the U.S.’s commitment to fighting the COVID-19 pandemic through multilateral collaboration. “Bombs and bullets cannot defend against COVID-19 or its future variants, to fight this pandemic we need a collective act of science and political will, we need to act now to get shots in arms as fast as possible,” he stated in his speech, marking global public health as a top priority for the administration. He also affirmed that the U.S. is reengaged with the World Health Organization and working with COVAX, a global initiative towards COVID-19 vaccine global access. Biden also noted that U.S. vaccine diplomacy comes with “no strings attached,” a reference to reports that China and Russia have been extracting demands from vaccine recipient countries. However, the very notion of vaccine diplomacy has strings attached as vaccines are traded for diplomatic ties, even if not explicitly stated by donor countries. This situation raises important questions about the ethical implications of vaccine diplomacy. 

“Bombs and bullets cannot defend against COVID-19 or its future variants, to fight this pandemic we need a collective act of science and political will, we need to act now to get shots in arms as fast as possible.” 

– U.S. President Joe Biden at the United Nations General Assembly

Vaccine Equity: a Moral Dilemma 

Another key issue posed by vaccine diplomacy is the moral issues with the distribution of vaccines for strategic, rather than purely humanitarian reasons. The WHO initially set out to create a system of vaccine distribution centered around equity of access through the COVAX initiative. Back in February, UN Secretary-General António Guterres addressed the issue stating: “At this critical moment, vaccine equity is the biggest moral test before the global community.” However, the WHO and international actors have since failed at securing fair access to vaccines, letting down developing countries by allowing monetary incentives and intellectual property laws to determine the output and distribution of these vaccines. 

“At this critical moment, vaccine equity is the biggest moral test before the global community.”

– UN Secretary-General António Guterres

While vaccine diplomacy presents a solution for many states seeking to gain quick access to vaccines, it also leaves countries vulnerable to ineffective vaccines. Additionally, states are often tied to diplomatic conditions from vaccine donor countries. Another major problem with vaccine diplomacy is obstacles to delivery due to distance and sensitive vaccine transportation requirements that may prevent some from benefiting from the practice altogether. Some analysts have tried to decouple vaccine diplomacy from ethical considerations and view it as a solely strategic practice. However, in the context of a pandemic where peoples’ lives are at stake, this cannot be viewed as a purely diplomatic exchange, there must be pushback against this rhetoric in order to ensure a more equitable rollout of vaccines. The practice of vaccine diplomacy also brings attention to the widening inequalities between richer and poorer countries. For example, countries such as the U.S. are throwing away doses that their citizens refuse, while in poorer countries, vaccine access is incredibly limited and demand is high. Additionally, the WHO found that six times more booster shots are being administered each day in richer countries than primary doses in the developing world, an alarming statistic that further points to discrepancies between rich and poor countries. The U.S. is moving in the right direction towards redistribution as President Biden announced on September 22 that the U.S. will double its global contribution of vaccines to 1 billion doses. Thus far, the majority of U.S. vaccine donations have gone to Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Columbia, South Africa, and Vietnam.

With frightening statistics showing that vaccines will not reach the poorest of countries until 2023, it is time for countries to rethink how they are engaging in vaccine deployment. Even without a stated quid pro quo, vaccine diplomacy encourages receiving states to strengthen diplomatic ties with vaccine donor states. This along with a myriad of other ethical concerns draw doubt to the practice of vaccine diplomacy. However, for now, it might be the most efficient way of getting populations vaccinated. It is important for donating countries to note that they stand to gain more than diplomatic relations from vaccine donations to other countries. Getting the world vaccinated as fast and as fairly as possible is the only real way to gain any sense of normalcy. Otherwise, variants will continue to evolve and we will continue to be on the defensive, responding to cases rather than preventing them from the start on a global scale. 

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Fall 2021 RA Posts

Permeability of New Perspectives? Gender Diversity in the Field of International Relations

By Woodie Tirfie
November 11, 2021

To view the terms, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/

The primary aim of international relations (IR) scholars and practitioners alike is to study, explain, and facilitate interactions between actors in the international system in hopes of addressing global issues. As such, diversity in perspectives is vital for the field. Yet, inequities based on gender still persist in both theory and practice, and women remain underrepresented in IR theories, teachings, and policymaking processes that constitute international relations. Data from Teaching, Research, and International Policy (TRIP) Project’s 2017 U.S. Faculty Survey provides a snapshot of this imbalance, and identifies areas that can be expanded upon to be more inclusive of historically ignored perspectives. Academia ultimately influences the approaches our future professors, politicians, diplomats, and public servants will adopt in their work. To maintain an insular network of scholars today is to promote gender inequality in all avenues of political science. Ultimately, international relations cannot truly become an equitable space until scholars and practitioners address and engage with issues relating to gender and privilege in the field. 

The 2017  U.S. Faculty Survey collected data from a total of 1,632 respondents, with 479 (29.7%) identifying as female and 1,134 (70.3%) identifying as male. This imbalance in the survey data reflects the IR discipline as a whole, which is largely male-dominated due to the patriarchal nature of academia (Crawford and Windsor). In fact, in 2008, only “26% of the 13,000 political science professors in the United States” were women (Sedowski and Brintall 2007). This is a stark contrast to 1980, when women constituted 10.3% of political science faculty in the United States. However, the percentage has only increased marginally in recent years, with 28.6% of political science faculty being women (Mershon et al. 2015). This increase is reflected in the TRIP data: in 2006, women made up 23% of the survey respondents, compared  to 29.7% in 2017. The increase could be an indication of more women entering the field. However, in the 2017 faculty survey, 7.52% of women said that they were not an IR scholar, in contrast with an even smaller 3.79% of men. Thus, even though there has been an overall increase in female scholarship, the playing field is not yet equal when comparing the number of women to the number of men in the discipline.

Citation bias, which is the tendency of men to refer to and cite other men rather than women in their academic works, hinders women’s professional advancement. In “Citation Count Data and Faculty Promotion,” Amanda Murdie presents survey data collected from 55 political scientists, 68.5% of which stated that their institution used citation data “half the time,” “frequently,” or “all the time” when promoting faculty members. The emphasis that is placed on citations in the professional world means that males, who are more likely to be cited due to the citation bias, are more likely to secure higher-ranking positions. This is evident in TRIP’s data, which shows that the title of assistant professor is the most held teaching position among women (31.94%), as opposed to the rank of full professor for men (35.71%). To combat citation bias, journals should diversify the pool of reviewers to include more women. They should also adjust submission guidelines, so that works with extreme gender citation bias will be reworked to include marginalized voices, or rejected if these criteria are not met (Ainley, Danewid, and Yao 2017).

While traditional IR theory is “gender-blind,” the feminist paradigm emphasizes the role that gender, as a socially constructed identity, and plays in “shaping the process of global politics” (Smith 2018). By doing so, feminists strive to shed light on issues that mainly women face, challenge gender norms, and study the intersectionality of international relations. Knowing this, it is unsurprising that of the group of respondents who selected feminism as their primary paradigmatic approach in their studies of IR, 88.9% were women.

Data from the 2017 U.S. Faculty Survey shows that there is also a gender imbalance within the paradigms that researchers employ. The most popular paradigm among women was constructivism, at 26%; yet, this percentage was much lower among men, at 17.4%. The percentages for constructivism and liberalism were very close among men, with 16.5% of men preferring the latter. On the other hand, only 11.9% of women identified as liberal. Realism was the most popular paradigm among men (23.4%), compared to only 10.1% of women identifying with realism. What drives men towards this paradigm is unclear, but realism emphasizes power, anarchy, and rationality, which are traditionally “masculine” characteristics, and views states as the primary actors (Etten 2014). Thus, realism deemphasizes the individual and does not consider which social group is in a position of power, as well as the implications that it may have on the priorities and interests of the state, which contrasts with the nontraditional paradigms that women are more likely to adhere to.

The higher inclination of women to adhere to nontraditional paradigms in comparison to men might be attributed to the personal experiences and challenges that they have faced as a marginalized population, which in turn shape their views in the gendered field of IR. This would also explain why, among those who selected gender as their main area of research in IR, 76.5% were women while only 23.5% were men. This further emphasizes a pattern of female domination in “nontraditional” paradigms. Gender is about the roles and norms that are “intrinsically woven into and practiced in our daily lives,” and gender studies is the study of “production, reproduction, and resistance to [these norms] that produce inequality” (Boise State University). They recognize the gaps in the traditional schools of thought, and therefore wish to fill them in by adopting a more holistic paradigmatic approach.

As for the other areas of research, there were also more women scholars and practitioners in the areas of global civil society (54.5%) and international/global health (60%). When further broken down, among women, 7.1% selected human rights as their main area of research, as opposed to 3.6% of men. Similar statistics can be seen in areas of research such as development studies.

There is a common theme among these areas of research: they all specifically deal with humanitarian issues. Thus, the reason women adhere to nontraditional paradigms more than men is also applicable to the question of why they focus their research on such areas: they all analyze and deal with systemic inequities that are similar to the gender-based challenges that they as women face. Daniel Maliniak, Amy Oakes, Susan Peterson, and Michael Tierney explore this imbalance, citing Ann Tickner: “women’s status in society helps them to see women’s (and other minorities’) marginality in scholarship (Tickner 2001). It is imperative that such holistic approaches and perspectives are brought to the forefront of IR academia.

Overall, permeability of perspectives that challenge the status quo is imperative in the field of international relations. The rising number of women pursuing IR careers, as well as emergence of nontraditional contemporary paradigms, show that the discipline has the potential to become a more equitable space. Yet, the problem is still a pronounced one— as a woman in my third year of studying government and economics, the lack of diversity among my peers and in the scholarly works that I read in my courses is jolting. It is discouraging to see that a woman’s work is the topic of discussion in many of my classes only when the topic of diversity arises. When discussing the most influential and impactful authors and articles in the discipline, male scholars such as John Mearsheimer or Joseph Nye are the only names I hear. There is much room for improvement, and scholars should integrate works written by women in curricula and expand the professional opportunities available to women. It is also imperative that faculty end the cycle of insularity in IR by encouraging their students to explore marginalized perspectives in IR, so that the cycle can be broken within the new generation of scholars, policymakers, and faculty.

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Fall 2021 RA Posts

Introducing the Student Team!

By Maggie Manson
September 22, 2021

Meet the 2021-2022 TRIP Student Team! We are a group of passionate students with a range of experiences that are all interested in bridging the gap between international relations academia and policy.

This fall, we are working on some exciting projects while continuing to publish student blog posts. With the support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, we are wrapping up our NGO and Think Tank staff surveys, which aim to gather information on when and how academic research on international relations is used within these organizations, as well as the views of practitioners on foreign policy topics. For the final output, we are compiling a dataset analyzing survey results, which we anticipate sharing soon.

We are also looking forward to fielding a new survey in partnership with the Sie Center for International Security and Diplomacy at the University of Denver’s Korbel School of International Studies this Fall.  This survey will build upon our last collaboration with Korbel, which looked at IR scholars’ perceptions of policy engagement with IR academia.

Finally, we are excited to share some of the recently published papers by TRIP affiliates: Forum: Did “America First” Construct America Irrelevant? and Does Social Science Inform Foreign Policy? Evidence from a Survey of US National Security, Trade, and Development Officials.

Over the coming months, we will be posting original blogs written by our RAs and keeping you updated on TRIP’s latest data! Here is some more information on each member of our student team:

Morgan Doll (she/her) is a senior at William & Mary majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics.

“I joined TRIP in the Fall of my sophomore year of college and have not stopped working here since (including over breaks!). I was immediately drawn to TRIP because of its tight-knit environment and the many opportunities for self-led growth in this group. A fun fact about me is that I go to a local grocery market almost every afternoon when home in Richmond to get a large sweet iced tea (can you tell I’m from the South?)”

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/morgan-doll-a15745177/

Maggie Manson (she/they) is a senior at William & Mary, majoring in International Relations and minoring in Middle Eastern Studies.

“I began working at TRIP my sophomore year (September 2019) and I am greatly interested in the policy relevancy of IR academia and improving the social impact of research. Outside of TRIP, I am currently conducting an honors thesis about the moderation/radicalization of Islamist parties in Algeria, Egypt, and Turkey after military coups. My main research interests include: the Algerian Civil War, International Security, the Israel-Palestine Conflict, Middle Eastern Politics, Military Defection, and Political Islam.”

LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/maggie-manson-952514169/

Mary Trimble (she/her) is a junior at William & Mary majoring in French and European Studies.

“I joined TRIP in February 2020 because I was inspired by TRIP’s mission to understand how IR research relates to the policy world. I’ve done a little bit of everything on the TRIP team, from contact collection for surveys and assisting on papers using TRIP data, to writing blog posts and managing the project’s social media accounts. According to meticulously kept Letterboxd records, I have watched almost 900 movies, so in my free time, I’m probably working towards 1000.”

Twitter: @marytrimble21

Angelina Paul (she/her) is a senior at William &Mary studying Government and Economics.

“I joined TRIP because I wanted to collect data and synthesize research that looks at how IR academia is comparable to current world events. Fun Fact: I met Michelle Obama and got to ask her a question and I used to be a competitive rock climber.”

Instagram: _angelinapaul

Facebook: Angelina Paul 

Nathaly Perez (she/her) is a senior at William & Mary, majoring in government and minoring in philosophy.

“I joined TRIP because I have always been curious about the influence IR has on policymaking. Currently, I am working on coding articles in the top IR/political science journals for future use in academic research.”

Shriya Kosuru (she/her) is a junior at William & Mary, majoring in Economics and minoring in Finance.

“I joined TRIP to learn more about how Academia and Policymaking are connected and their role in the decision-making process. It has been great to learn more about IR from an academic and theoretical perspective in order to better understand real-world events. I have worked at TRIP on contact collection, data organization, and writing a blog. Fun Fact: I can speak 5 languages!”

Social media- @shriya0024 (Instagram)

Woodie Tirfie (she/her) is a junior at William & Mary, majoring in Economics and Government.

“I joined TRIP because I am interested in learning about the interconnections between research, academia, and the policy-making process!”

Social media: @Woodie Tirfie  (Instagram)

Minkyong Song (she/her) is a senior at William & Mary, majoring in Computer Science.

“I joined TRIP because I was inspired by how collecting and analyzing data can help people to understand research in IR. I want to apply data science to the research of political science and I look forward to doing so in this role.”

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Fall 2021 RA Posts

Can Neoliberalism Persist? Should it?

By Maggie Manson
August 25, 2021

With the defeat of President Donald Trump in the recent U.S. presidential election and the apparent end of “Trumpism,” a political era and ideology defined by an exclusive conception of nationalism, populism, and conspiracy; one might expect things to return to business as usual under the presidency of Joe Biden. Business as usual refers to the political phenomenon that has shaped U.S. domestic and foreign policy, as well as the greater global economy since the 1970s: neoliberalism. 

“The election of President Trump in 2016 is a key demonstration of the failings of neoliberalism.”

Neoliberalism as an economic concept can be characterized by free-market capitalism, privatization, deregulation, and societal freedom from government intervention. However, American neoliberalism has reached beyond the scope of laissez-faire economic philosophy, as it has been expanded to a paradigmatic lens for academics and policymakers to view international relations. Neoliberalism has thus contributed significantly to the consolidation of a formalized global economic market, as well as U.S. foreign policymaking in the past 50 years. While many see globalization and the dominance of neoliberal ideology as a resounding triumph for not only the U.S. but also for the greater global community, the election of President Trump in 2016 is a key demonstration of the failings of neoliberalism. 

Neoliberalism and the Presidency

The political bases of President Trump and conversely, Senator Bernie Sanders, represent anti-establishment views and appeal to their supporters using rhetoric that rejects the U.S. neoliberal status quo from opposite sides of the political spectrum. Some might argue that Trump’s election and subsequent political ideology are a rebuke of neoliberalism and the current global order, however, a more realistic assessment would be that Trump’s presidency is merely a symptom of neoliberalism. Despite his untraditional rejection of multilateralism, Trump himself is an unabashed neoliberal. While his campaign rhetoric of “America first” and his loyal base, many of whom have been left behind in the era of globalization, represent a reproach of neoliberalism, the policy actions of his administration prove otherwise. Outside of his approach to trade, Trump continually pushed for capitalist, free-market policies on a domestic and international scale, as well as engaged in a spend-heavy, neoliberalist approach to the U.S. military budget throughout the duration of his presidency. 

Consequences of Neoliberalism

Examining the key international consequences/ trends that have emerged as a result of neoliberalism is a good foundation to understanding the pushback against it. This is not an exhaustive list and it is often difficult to distinguish events as the result of neoliberalism or other global phenomena that can be examined through a neoliberalist lens. Additionally, it is equally difficult to look at these results in the context of U.S. foreign policy as this analysis often obscures what is a deliberate policy choice and what is merely an accidental, yet consequential result of neoliberalism. Despite these limitations, my interpretation of the most consequential outcomes of the neoliberal era of U.S. foreign policy is as follows. 

Neoliberalism arguably emerged as the leading U.S. foreign policy paradigm due to a key tenet of neoliberalism: globalization. The connections made through the increased financialization of the global economy, as well as the establishment of a neoliberal world order, laid the groundwork for widespread U.S. intervention following a neoliberal philosophy. 

Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods System, a new political-economic world order emerged that called for the deregulation of global markets through capital control abolition and competitive deregulation. This seismic shift away from embedded liberalism and government intervention in the international monetary system led to unprecedented economic growth by not only more developed countries like the U.S. and U.K. but also by emerging markets such as Japan and China. This hands-off approach resulted in stunning economic growth for many, but ultimately, also increased inequality for others, primarily in the developing world. 

Other significant consequences such as the increased role of private funding in international development, as well as the rise of the contractor state, have emerged as problematic policies from neoliberalism. Through funding mechanisms, the private sector has been able to exert significant influence in the development space, which presents some ethical concerns surrounding these projects. Similar to the issues presented by the privatization of development, the outsourcing of government responsibilities to the private sector has led to the creation of the military-industrial complex. This environment has resulted in a cycle that commodifies military action and violence in which an overseas deployment, that could’ve been prevented through diplomatic action, results in someone receiving a large check. 

The shared theme between these consequences of neoliberalism is the idea that human-focused policy (i.e. military and development) is driven primarily by economic incentives. Why is any of this actually bad for the United States or the world? Well, when human-centric policy is driven by cost-benefit analysis rather than a qualitative assessment of how it will impact lives, people are thus commodified and valued primarily by what they consume or produce. This is especially dangerous in policymaking as it dehumanizes issues that should focus on helping others/ preventing harm, but are now essentially economic issues due to neoliberal thinking.

Another major issue posed by neoliberalism is the global platform/ influence that has been given to anti-democratic countries with spotty human rights records. Neoliberalism, for the most part, has maintained U.S. hegemony on the global stage but has also meant the beginning of the end of U.S. unilateralism. When the U.S. decided to de-commit from the gold standard, thus throwing off the international monetary order consisting of currencies pegged to the USD, it guaranteed that it would no longer be the center of the global monetary system in the future. While the U.S. has, for the most part, retained its hegemonic position throughout the period of neoliberalism, we are now seeing the rise of a multipolar system where rising powers such as China, also exert significant influence over the global monetary relations and even global political attitudes. If China continues on its projected path of economic growth, neoliberalism might contribute to another dramatic realignment of the global order, potentially one with a non-democratic country at the helm. The rise of China as the new economic center of the neoliberal world order would afford the ruling Chinese Communist Party the platform to potentially convey anti-democratic values on a global scale.  

What the Scholars Think

Two TRIP Snap Polls demonstrate scholarly support for neoliberal governance, based on their preferences for certain presidential policies. In Snap Poll 14 (October 2020), scholars were asked “to what extent would U.S. foreign policy differ between Trump and Biden in the following areas?” with categories spanning from international trade to human rights. Results show an estimated 89.3% difference in Biden’s engagement with multilateral organizations, 83.4% difference in management of military alliances, and 66% difference in trade relations. 

High engagement and cooperation with international, multilateral organizations such as the World Trade Organization or the United Nations is a key facet of neoliberalism. Additionally, regional military collaboration, specifically with the North American Treaty Organization, works to uphold U.S. hegemonic military power as a key element of neoliberalism.  In Snap Poll 15, 93.65% of scholars grading Biden’s performance in alliances and international organizations policy between A and B+ with a mean score of 3.56 (falling between an A- and B+). From these findings, is clear that Biden’s multilateral and thus neoliberal approach ranks better with scholars than Trump’s America-first strategy. Based on scholarly approval of these neoliberal approaches, we can infer that scholars are still in favor of neoliberalism’s influence over U.S. foreign policy, especially related to military and international organization engagement.

Additionally, scholars’ predictions of a 66% difference in trade relations signal that scholars assumed Biden would take a less protectionist and more neoliberal approach to trade, in contrast to Trump’s “trade war” and high tariffs. In regards to scholar’s views on how Biden has actually performed after his first 100 days (found in Snap Poll 15), we see that 67.25% of scholars at least somewhat approve of Biden’s handling of international trade (15.67% strongly approve, 51.49% somewhat approve). These results indicate that so far, scholars approve of Biden’s neoliberal approach to international trade, and are not opposed to neoliberalism in the Biden presidency.

In Snap Poll 14, we see that scholars tend to disapprove of Trump (compared to Biden) with 93% of scholars stating that their foreign policy views align more closely with Biden and only 4% of scholars stating that they would vote for Trump. However, the disapproval of Trump does not necessarily signal that Trump and Biden are opposites when it comes to neoliberal governance. Snap Poll 14 also shows mixed responses to the question of: “to what extent would U.S. foreign policy differ between the two in the following areas?” For economic areas such as trade and exchange rates, as well as the use of military force, there is no majority of scholars expecting significant change in Trump vs. Biden’s policies. The assumption that Trump and Biden’s approach to economic governance and military action might be similar, as well as the actions of the previous administration, show Trump’s tendencies to follow the neoliberal approach in some issue areas. 

Here to Stay (for now)

An important question we must ask ourselves now that we have seen the ideological shortcomings of neoliberalism through some of its key consequences, should a new global paradigm replace neoliberalism? With increased pressure from the working class right and anti-capitalist leftists, is it time for the U.S. and other global adherents to rethink the ideological basis by which they govern and approach global relations? Or, despite the outlined consequences, perhaps scholars’ support for Biden’s neoliberal policies indicates that scholarly opinion is more influential than public pushback in terms of crafting foreign policy, signaling the continuance of neoliberalism. 

My analysis of these snap poll findings even in the context of neoliberalism’s problems is that they signal the continuance of neoliberalism with minimal scholarly or mainstream disapproval. However, this does not mean that future U.S. leaders will be able to sustain the neoliberal world order forever. With the potential of a bipolar world order due to the rise of China combined with popular disillusionment of the status quo post-Trump presidency, I believe that a seismic change is eventually inevitable. Arguments against development privatization, the contractor state, and the financialization of the global economy may not be widespread, but leftist political figures such as Bernie Sanders or Ayanna Pressley are beginning to call more attention to the issues with these policies and the downfalls of neoliberalism. On top of that, U.S. voters have already expressed their discontent with globalization in the 2016 election, either by voting for Bernie Sanders in the Democratic primary or for Trump in the general election. As noteworthy academic Professor John J. Mearsheimer once proclaimed liberal hegemony is a bankrupt strategy,” and it will be interesting to see if an entirely new ideology will eventually emerge in neoliberalism’s place.